

















  Health Insurance Transitions After Retirement:  
Did HIPAA Expand Coverage for Retirees?   
                    
               Kanika Kapur, University College Dublin and  











UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 









 Health Insurance Transitions After Retirement: Did HIPAA Expand 
Coverage for Retirees? 
    
By Kanika Kapur* and Jeannette Rogowski** 
 
 
* Lecturer, School of Economics, University College Dublin, 
Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland, phone: (353)1-716-4624, email: 
kanika.kapur@ucd.ie  
 
** University Professor, Department of Health Systems and 
Policy, UMDNJ-School of Public Health, 335 George Street, Suite 




Address correspondence to Kanika Kapur 
 
May 9, 2005   2
Health Insurance Transitions After Retirement: Did HIPAA Expand 
Coverage for Retirees? 
 
   3
ABSTRACT 
The near elderly are a vulnerable segment of the population 
with high-expected medical expenses. Individuals who retire 
before Medicare eligibility may lose employer provided health 
insurance, and may face a potentially costly uninsured period. 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study from 1992 to 
2002 to profile the insurance status of workers who retire.  We 
also evaluate the role of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in reducing the number of uninsured 
among the near elderly. We find that a relatively small 
proportion of workers lose health insurance on retirement; 
however, we find no evidence that HIPAA has helped these workers 
to remain insured.   4
INTRODUCTION 
The near elderly are a vulnerable segment of the 
population.  Because the prevalence of poor health and 
chronic disease rises with age, the near elderly have 
higher expected medical expenses than younger cohorts.  For 
instance, average annual health care expenditures for 
persons age 45-64 are 85% higher than for persons aged 18-
44 ($3,500 compared to $1,900).
1 Furthermore, expenditures 
are extremely skewed with the top 1% of the population 
accounting for 25-29% of the expenditures, and the bottom 
50% accounting for only 3% of expenditures.
2 As a result, 
uninsured households face a wealth depletion of 20% in the 
face of a health shock compared to a drop of 2% for insured 
households.
3   
Prior to the age of Medicare eligibility (65), 
employer-provided health insurance is a valuable resource 
for the near elderly.  While 38% of all retirees over age 
65 were covered by employment-based insurance in 2002, 64% 
of early retirees (55–64) had such coverage. Despite the 
importance of retiree health insurance, employer coverage 
for retirees has been declining over time. While 68% of 
retirees were covered by employer provided health insurance 
in 1992, only 45% of retirees had such coverage in 2002.   5
Furthermore, 45% of workers were offered retiree health 
insurance coverage in 1992 compared with 30% in 2002.
4  
The availability of health insurance is a crucial 
factor in maintaining the health of the near elderly, 
particularly because the onset of chronic conditions is 
likely at this age. People who are uninsured are much more 
likely than those with insurance to forgo needed medical 
care.  They are also less likely to receive preventive care 
and regular care for chronic conditions, and they typically 
receive lower quality of care.
5  Reduced access to medical 
care among the uninsured has been shown to lead to poorer 
self reported health, increased functional limitations, and 
higher mortality rates.
6  The deterioration in health status 
that results from lack of health insurance for the near 
elderly is likely to have implications for health care 
costs after age 65, during the time that Medicare provides 
health insurance coverage to seniors.
7   
The near elderly can have problems gaining access to 
affordable health insurance.  Few routes to public 
insurance exist:  Unless blind or disabled, persons under 
age 65 cannot qualify for Medicare or Medicaid.  Options 
for purchasing health insurance in the private market are 
often equally restrictive, largely because of high premium 
costs. Workers who leave an insured job have the option to   6
continue group coverage—known as COBRA coverage-for up to 
18 months by paying 102% of the premium.
8 Only a small 
fraction of those eligible to purchase COBRA coverage do 
so, however, take-up is higher among older workers.
9 The 
high cost of COBRA coverage ($7,000 to $8,0000 for family 
coverage) may be a deterrent for many, especially for those 
who have just left a job.
10  
Title I of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandates that health 
insurance coverage must be offered, without pre-existing 
condition exclusions, to qualifying individuals who leave 
group employment. States can choose to mandate that health 
insurance companies guarantee issue products to qualifying 
individuals. States can also choose to mandate an 
“acceptable alternative mechanism” to comply with HIPAA, 
such as expanding the state’s high-risk pool to incorporate 
qualifying individuals. HIPAA does not incorporate any 
premium regulation; therefore, it is unclear that HIPAA 
insurance is affordable for early retirees. However, HIPAA 
provides a longer-term guarantee of access and so may have 
larger effects than COBRA on insurance.    
The existing literature on the effects of HIPAA has 
not found that the individual market grew; however, the 
literature has been hampered by the inability to control   7
for general trends in insurance and for pre-reform 
availability of insurance.
11 In addition, previous research 
has not focused specifically on the near elderly retiree 
population that we believe are most likely to be affected 
by HIPAA. 
In this study, we use data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) from 1992 to 2002 to profile the 
insurance status of workers who retire. We conduct a 
descriptive analysis of the time path of insurance coverage 
after retirement, and analyze the factors that are 
associated with a loss of health insurance.  We also 
evaluate the role of HIPAA in reducing the number of 
uninsured among the near elderly. Understanding the 
effectiveness of current policy, and determining the extent 
and nature of the problem of the uninsured among the near 
elderly is an important step to designing effective policy 
for covering these individuals. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
Our analysis uses the HRS, a nationally representative 
panel survey of individuals born from 1931 to 1941 in the 
first wave of the survey.  Following the first wave of data 
collection in 1992, subsequent waves of data have been   8
collected every two years. We use the first six waves of 
the HRS (1992-2002).  In addition to basic demographic and 
health data, the HRS collects detailed longitudinal 
information about labor force status, health insurance, 
retiree health benefits, income, and wealth. Information on 
state of residence is also available for the restricted use 
HRS data set. Data are collected for sampled individuals 
and their spouses.  
  We restrict the analysis sample to individuals who 
retire during the panel survey, and select the observations 
after the reported retirement date, but before the age of 
Medicare eligibility (65). Our sample consists of 2653 
individuals, and of these 1902 had employer provided health 
insurance at the time of their retirement.
12 Each 
individual’s post-retirement insurance history is cast in 
two-year periods (corresponding to the waves of HRS data 
collection). So, each individual can have up to five 
observations. Our analytic file consists of 5140 
individual-wave observations.  
  The HRS health insurance data was redesigned in 2002. 
Unfortunately, the insurance categories are not comparable 
between the pre-2002 period and the 2002 wave. Therefore, 
we have restricted our analysis of the 2002 data to a 
variable that measures whether or not an individual is   9




Profile of Health Insurance for Retirees 
We conducted a descriptive analysis of the time path 
of health insurance status after retirement, and tabulated 
post-retirement health insurance by the retiree’s health 
insurance status before retirement.  
We fit a logit model for insured status after 
retirement.  The explanatory variables in our model 
included worker demographics (age, sex, education, marital 
status, and race), health (medical conditions, self 
reported health, and body mass index), and last job 
characteristics (wage and tenure). The model also contained 
spouse characteristics, if the worker was married. These 
included demographics, health, and job characteristics if 
employed. The model also included a variable for the 
availability of health insurance after retirement from a 
spouse’s employer provided plan or from the workers’ own 
retiree health insurance plan, and control variables for 
the number of waves after retirement. 
All analyses were weighted using the sample weights in 
the HRS. Marginal effects are shown as the average,   10
predicted insurance rates for the estimation sample at each 
value of the characteristic.    
 
Estimation of the Effect of HIPAA on Health Insurance 
Our analytic design focuses on before-after HIPAA 
comparisons of insurance rates within groups of states and 
within groups of affected individuals.
13 Because states 
differed in their individual market regulations prior to 
the implementation of HIPAA, we form clusters of states 
that had a similar pre-regulatory environment and examine 
changes post-HIPAA within this cluster of similar states. 
We also identify a control group of states that had pre-
HIPAA regulations that matched or exceeded the HIPAA reform 
requirements. Changes that we observe in these states are 
used as a measure of the secular trend that would otherwise 
have occurred in the absence of HIPAA in the states that 
adopted new regulation in response to HIPAA. That is, by 
comparing the change in an outcome among states that 
adopted legislation to conform to HIPAA requirements with 
the change in states that did not need to do so, we infer 
how much of the observed change is due to the legislation 
and how much to secular change.  
We supplement this analysis by also comparing 
insurance rates of sub-groups of individuals before and   11
after the implementations of HIPAA that we expect are more 
and less likely to be affected by HIPAA, within states that 
did not have state regulations that matched HIPAA. Sub-
groups with access to alternative health insurance plans, 
for example through spousal coverage, are less likely to be 
affected by HIPAA than sub-groups who do not have such 
access. Furthermore, sub-groups with high expected health 
costs are more likely to value health insurance coverage, 
and therefore benefit from HIPAA’s provisions.  Comparing 
pre-and post-HIPAA changes in subpopulations with different 
insurance opportunities or with different expected health 
costs within states that lacked pre-HIPAA access reforms 
provides another test of the effects of HIPAA and provides 
a robustness check for the results.   
States adopted different approaches to meeting the 
individual portability provisions of HIPPA, for example, 
high-risk pools, guaranteed issue, mandatory conversion.  
These different approaches may have different effects on 
insurance.  We focus on two implementation strategies that 
were adopted by most states — high-risk pools and the 
federal fallback that requires all carriers to guarantee 
issue to HIPAA eligibles.  For each implementation 
strategy, we distinguish states that had some regulations   12
providing for issue of individual health insurance from 
those that did not, since HIPAA effects may be greater in 
the latter states than in the former.
14 We form four 
“experimental” state groups and one control state group 
(Exhibit 1), and compare insurance rates in each of the 
experimental groups with rates in the control group.  
The dependent variable in the analysis of the effect 
of HIPAA on insurance indicates whether an individual has 
insurance or not. The model also includes a full set of 
state dummies and year dummies to control for time 
invariant state differences and for trends and time shocks 
to insurance. The model also includes a full set of 
demographic control variables including age dummies, sex, 
race, family composition, and health. Last job information 
is also included, if available.  
 
RESULTS 
Health Insurance Profile of New Retirees 
  In the wave prior to retirement, 90% of workers have 
employer provided health insurance (Exhibit 2). For 77% of 
workers, this coverage is through their own employer and 
for 13% coverage is through their spouse’s employer. After 
retirement, own employer provided coverage drops to 58%, 
and spousal coverage rises to 18%, suggesting that new   13
retirees seek out spouse coverage in lieu of their own 
employer provided coverage. Public insurance and other 
private coverage also rise after retirement. However, 
despite the increase in non-employer sources of health 
insurance, the percent uninsured rises from 5% before 
retirement to 11% after retirement. Earlier research found 
similar trends in employer-provided health insurance using 
data from the mid-1980s; however, the earlier data found 
that uninsured rates only increased by 2 percentage points 
post-retirement (from 7 to 9%), and a higher proportion of 
retirees obtained privately purchased health insurance 
(13%).
15
  For individuals who had employer provided coverage 
before retirement, 71% continue to be covered by their 
employers after retirement either with continuation 
coverage policies or with retiree health insurance (Exhibit 
3). However, 10% of those with employer coverage become 
uninsured. Almost three-quarters of individuals who were 
covered by spousal health insurance before retirement 
retain this insurance after retirement. Even after 
reporting retirement, a small fraction of individuals who 
did not have own employer coverage prior to retiring report 
having own employer coverage. These individuals gain   14
coverage by becoming reemployed in jobs that offer health 
insurance after reporting retirement. 
  The time path of health insurance coverage for 
retirees who had own employer health insurance shows a 
decline in own employer coverage between the first and the 
second waves after retirement, from 71% to 60%; however own 
employer coverage does not change much after the second 
wave (Exhibit 4). Individuals who purchase continuation 
coverage from their employer cannot keep it longer than 18 
months, and therefore, this coverage is exhausted by the 
second wave after retirement. The percent uninsured and the 
percent covered by alternative private health insurance 
sources remains relatively stable over time; however, 
public insurance coverage rises over time, with more of the 
near elderly becoming eligible for Medicare through 
disability. 
 
Factors that Affect Insurance after Retirement 
Exhibit 5 shows that retirees’ demographic 
characteristics are significantly associated with the 
propensity to retain insurance after retirement. Women are 
over 2 percentage points more likely to remain insured 
after retirement – this difference can be attributed to the 
fact that women are more likely to obtain coverage from   15
their husbands. Higher educated retirees are also more 
likely to retain insurance. Not surprisingly, retirees who 
are offered retiree employer coverage are 3 percentage 
points more likely to remain insured. Retirees in fair or 
poor health are more likely to lose insurance, possibly 
because they face higher premiums in the individual market. 
Family characteristics such as access to spousal insurance 
and high family income also increase the likelihood of 
maintaining health insurance after retirement.  
 
Effect of HIPAA on Insurance 
The results from the multivariate analysis of the 
effect of HIPAA on insurance rates show that HIPAA appears 
to have a positive, but statistically insignificant effect 
on insurance.
16 Exhibit 6 reports that the effect of HIPAA 
on insurance, adjusted for comparisons to control states 
and time periods, is small -- between 0.04 and 0.2 
percentage points. However, the confidence intervals around 
these estimates are wide enough that they cannot preclude 
that HIPAA had an effect on insurance.  
  Alternative estimation strategies that compared 
insurance rates for individuals with high demand for health 
insurance before and after HIPAA, and that compared 
insurance rates for individuals who had access to spouse   16
health insurance versus those who did not, before and after 
HIPAA, also yielded statistically insignificant estimates. 
These results are not reported in the tables. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Health insurance is an important benefit for the near 
elderly after retirement. Our analysis shows that only a 
small proportion of those who had own employer health 
insurance before retirement lose this coverage. However, 
retirees who lose coverage tend to be in poorer health, less 
educated, and with lower family income. These individuals 
are likely to be financially vulnerable in the face of high 
medical expenses. Furthermore, such retirees may be more 
likely to have lapses in their preventive care and to have 
problems maintaining their medical regimens and 
prescriptions, leading to higher health costs during their 
years of Medicare eligibility.  
  We find no evidence that insurance rates have increased 
for the near elderly as a result of the passage of HIPAA. 
Even though HIPAA guarantees the availability of individual 
health insurance, it is not accompanied by any restrictions 
on health insurance premiums. It is possible that individual 
health insurance premiums are too high for the lower income 
near elderly to find affordable. The average monthly single   17
premium in 2003 was $210 and the average monthly family 
premium was $322.
17 For the near elderly, in states without 
premium regulation, HIPAA premiums can be much higher than 
these averages. For individuals with low family income who 
have lost wage income due to retirement, these premiums may 
be unaffordable. For individuals who can afford to purchase 
health insurance, COBRA coverage already provides some 
bridge insurance coverage, further minimizing the potential 
impact of HIPAA. 
Recently, tax credits have been advocated as a method 
to help low-income individuals to purchase individual 
health insurance.  The Bush Administration has proposed tax 
credits for low-income families who do not have access to 
employer-sponsored coverage.
18  Most research has been quite 
pessimistic about the potential impact of tax credits, 
since health insurance take-up appears not to be very 
responsive to small reductions in the price.
19 However, it 
is possible that the near elderly may value health 
insurance enough to purchase coverage if provided with 
sufficient assistance. 
    18
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NOTES  20
EXHIBIT 1: HIPAA ANALYTIC PLAN: STATE GROUPINGS
State 
Group 
Number Pre-HIPAA State Regulations Post-HIPAA state compliance method Example
1 No pre-HIPAA state regulation   Guaranteed issue AZ
2 Some pre-HIPAA state regulation  Guaranteed issue  CA 
3 No pre-HIPAA state regulation  High risk pool  IL 
4 Some pre-HIPAA state regulation  High risk pool  CT
5 State regulations met or exceeded HIPAA 
N/A: state regulations met or exceeded 
HIPAA NY 
   21
EXHIBIT 2: HEALTH INSURANCE PROFILE BEFORE AND AFTER RETIREMENT
Health Insurance Type
Pre-Retirement Post-Retirement
Own Employer Health Insurance 77% 58%
Spouse Employer Health Insurance 13% 18%
Public Insurance 2% 5%
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EXHIBIT 3: INSURANCE TRANSITIONS AFTER RETIREMENT
Primary Source of 
Insurance Before 
Retirement
Own EPHI Spouse EPHI Public Insurance Other Private Uninsured Total
Own EPHI 71.3% 10.2% 3.6% 4.7% 10.2% 100.0%
Spouse EPHI 16.5% 72.7% 1.9% 3.5% 5.5% 100.0%
Public Insurance 9.1% 3.0% 72.1% 0.0% 15.8% 100.0%
Other Private 4.5% 6.0% 9.5% 59.1% 20.9% 100.0%
Uninsured 6.5% 6.3% 16.7% 6.8% 63.7% 100.0%
Primary Source of Insurance After Retirement
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EXHIBIT 5: FACTORS THAT AFFECT INSURANCE AFTER RETIREMENT
 (Fitted predictions from a logit model of health insurance coverage on retirees)
Retiree Characteristics Percent Insured 
Sex
  Male 92.2 ** 7.8
  Female 94.8 5.2
Education
  Less than High School 91 ** 9
  High School 93.4 6.6
  College 97.3 2.7
Health
  Good 94.6 ** 5.4
  Fair/Poor 91.1 8.9
Employer Retiree Health Insurance
  Offered 95 * 5
  Not Offered 91.6 8.4
Family Characteristics
Spouse EPHI
  EPHI 96.1 * 3.9
  No EPHI 92.9 7.1
Spouse Education
  Less than High School 92.5 ** 7.5
  High School 94.3 5.7
  College 97.9 2.1
Family Income
  10th pctile 93 * 7
  90th pctile 95 5
Number of Cases 1562
* denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level
** denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level
Note: The following variables were included in the model but are not reported in the table --
Age, spouse age, marital status, wage, spouse wage, tenure, spouse tenure, medical conditions
BMI, number of waves after retirement.  
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EXHIBIT 6: EFFECT OF HIPAA ON INSURANCE RATES




Percentage Point Effect 
on Insurance
No pre-HIPAA vs. all pre-HIPAA, Guaranteed Issue 1 vs. 5 0.04
No pre-HIPAA vs. all pre-HIPAA, High Risk pool 3 vs. 5 0.04
No or some pre-HIPAA vs. all pre-HIPAA (1,2,3,4) vs. 5 0.2
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